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REMARKS
WHO OR WHAT KILLED THE PHILADELPIHIA
CONSTITUTION?*
George Carey**
Let me explore at the outset what my title presumes; namely, that the
document crafted by our Founding Fathers in Philadelphia over the course of the
summer of 1788 is a dead letter Many, if not most, Americans-particularly
* Article adapted from a presentation at the University of Tulsa sponsored by the University and
the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 23 February 2000.
** George Carey is a Professor of Government at Georgetown University where he teaches
American political theory. Among his publications is THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC *University of Illinios Press, 1995).
1. Throughout I write of the Philadelphia Constitution; that is, the Constitution sans the first ten
amendments. I do so because I want to avoid a controversy that would only cloud the basic issue with
which I am dealing. As Ralph Rossum points out there is a distinct tendency today to view the original
Constitution and the Bill of Rights as separate and even antagonistic documents. When, for instance,
Constitutional Law texts, as they frequently do, accord separate treatment to the Bill of Rights and
individual rights, they suggest, as Rossum puts it, "that the basis of individual rights is in not the
Constitution itself [the Philadelphia Constitution] but the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment." RALPH ROSSUM, "THE FEDERALIST'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION AS A
BILL OF RIGHTS," SAVING THE REVOLUTION, 220 (Charles R. Kessler ed. 1987).
That the Federalists did not look upon the Bill of Rights as altering the basic constitutional
design is evident from Madison's remarks in the first session of the House of Representative
supporting the introduction of those provisions that later would form the corpus of the Bill of Rights.
At the conclusion of his address outlining his version of rights, he assures the Federalist majority "that
nothing is in contemplation, so far as I have mentioned, that can endanger the beauty of the
Government in any one important feature, even in the eyes of its most sanguine admirers." While he
maintains that the Constitution will enjoy greater support with the addition of rights, he is quick to add
that this is done "without weakening its frame or abridging its usefulness in the judgment of those who
are attached to it." Annals, 1st Congress, 1 session, 441. Madison had the difficult task of dealing, on
one side, with the Antifederalists in Congress who wanted amendments that would weaken federal
authority and, on the other, with the Federalists were ill-disposed towards any alterations of or
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those who can recall their college or high school classes in civics or American
government-might well be startled by this presumption. Certainly no such
presumption seems to be shared by those elites (e.g., politicians, lawyers, media
commentators, editorial writers) that are so influential in shaping our political
understanding and discourse. Moreover, the institutions and processes established
by the Philadelphia Convention are, for the most part, still very much a part of our
political landscape. How, then, can it be said that the Philadelphia Constitution is
no longer operative; that it no longer enjoys the status of "fundamental law"
whose provisions could only be changed through the amendment process?'
DEATH OF THE PHILADELPHIA CONSTITUTION
I have concluded, for reasons that I will spell out in due course, that the
Philadelphia Constitution is dead because, even though the institutions and
processes it established are still there, its character-one might say its "essence"-
has changed to such an extent that today it bears only a nominal connection to its
1789 version. I hasten to add that I am not alone in this assessment. Many close
students of the political trends and developments of the Twentieth Century have
commented on the drastic changes that have taken place with regard to one or
more of the fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution.3 Consider
additions to the Constitution.
A basic Federalist argument, articulated by Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST, was that prohibiting
the national government from the exercise of powers it did not possess could be used to argue that the
powers of the national government were plenary, rather than limited to those delegated.
Clearly, the judicial application of the Bill of Rights to the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment has changed the fundamental character of the Philadelphia Constitution. On this see text
below.
2. The basic argument offered by Hamilton for judicial review in Federalist no. 78 was that the
Constitution represented "fundamental law" that could not be altered by the institutions it created; i.e.,
the "constitutive" will of the people embodied in the Constitution can be altered by the "political" of
the people operating through institutions by the constitutive will. "Until the people have by some
solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed the established form, it is biding upon themselves
collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can
warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act." See THE FEDERALIST No. 78
at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds. 1990). In Federalist No. 53,
Madison put the matter this way: Americans, more than the people "in any other country," seem to
understand the "important distinction... between a constitution established by the people, and
unalterable by the government; and a law established by the government, and alterable by the
government." See THE FEDERALIST No. 53 at 227 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James
McClelan, eds. 1990).
It should be noted that essentially the same line of argument was used by Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, (1803) in justifying judicial review. In other words, "originalism," in the sense of
preserving the "constitutive will" of the people, served as a fundamental starting point for justifying
judicial review in the first place.
3. Examples of thoughtful works that indicate in detail the nature and effect of these changes
would include: JAMES BURNHAM, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION (Henry Regnery
Company, 1959); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (University of Oklahoma
Press, 1989); and CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, Tim SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL (Atherton Press, 1963).
None of the authors, it is true, explicitly subscribe to my position regarding the death of the
Constitution. Each would seem to hold that restoration of the original design is possible through
reform of one sort or another. But their works when taken together unmistakably show that the
structural integrity of the Philadelphia Constitution has been damaged beyond repair. Burger points to
the centralization which has culminated in a unitary, not a federal system; Hyneman to the emergence
of an unrestrained judiciary that has usurped legislative functions; and Burnham to the alarming
[Vol. 36:621
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Theodore Lowi's The End of Liberalism, certainly one of the most notable,
comprehensive, and widely read books on the character of the American system.
When this provocative work first appeared in 1969, shortly after Richard Nixon
assumed the presidency, Lowi wrote with foreboding "that the ideologies and
policies" that seemed to be driving American politics "were threatening to
produce a deep and permanent change in the American constitution.
4
Consequently, he subtitled his book, "Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of
Authority." Ten years later, when drafting the second edition of this work, he was
convinced that the challenges had not been met; that "a series of adjustments" had
cumulatively produced "fundamental changes" in our constitutional structure to
the extent that we were "operating under" a new, but "unwritten constitution."5
Accordingly, he subtitled his second edition, "The Second Republic of the United
States."
Unlike many of his colleagues on the Left, Lowi did not look favorably upon
this new constitutional order. By way of indicating the nature of his concerns and
discontents, he offered up his version of this new, "unwritten constitution." In his
account, the changes in the regime first introduced by Franklin Roosevelt's New
Deal were adopted in the policies of John Kennedy and notably advanced by
those of Lyndon Johnson, particularly his "Great Society" initiatives. These
changes, in effect, were finally authenticated by the embrace of Richard Nixon,
who lent them a bi-partisan character.
Character of New Constitution. It is instructive to examine what Lowi
understands to be the character of this new, unwritten constitution because it so
closely accords with the prevailing and accepted practices of our system today. Its
"PREAMBLE," as he perceives it, declares that "There ought to be a national
growth of presidential power and authority.
Perhaps Burnham might agree with my thesis. Writing in 1959 and stressing the indispensability
of Congress for the preservation of liberty, he offers a pessimistic prognosis for both liberty and the
Framers' Constitution. In his last chapter he concludes that the survival of Congress is "not probable,"
given the developments and trends of the preceding decades. By survival he means a Congress that is
truly independent, with a will of its own, capable of controlling the bureaucracy and limiting the
president. See supra note 13.
Albert Jay Nock certainly must be ranked among the first to perceive the collapse of the
Philadelphia Constitution. Writing that the Congressional elections of 1934 established a new regime,
he observes:
This regime was established by a coup D'etat of a new and unusual kind, practicable only a
rich country. It was effected, not by violence, like Louis-Napoleon's, or by terrorism, like
Mussolini's, but by purchase .... Our national legislature was not suppressed by force of
arms, like the French Assembly in 1852, but was bought out of its functions with public
money... the consolidation of the coup D'etat was effected by the same means; the
corresponding functions in the smaller units were reduced under the personal control of the
Executive.
See ALBERT JAY NOCK, OUR ENEMY, THE STATE (Hallberg Publishing, 1994) (1935).
For more recent appraisals of our system in the Nockean vein, see ROBERT NISBET, TWILIGHT
OF AUTHORrrY (Oxford University Press, 1975), and ROBERT NISBET, THE PRESENT AGE (Harper
and Row, 1988). On Nisbet's showing, the decline of the original system has been precipitous since the
New Deal. He maintains that even under Reagan's presidency it continued virtually unabated.
4. THEODORE J. LoWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM, xi (W.W. Norton 2 ed. 1979).
5. Id.
2001]
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presence in every aspect of the lives of American citizens. National power is no
long a necessary evil, it is a positive virtue.",6 Article I, in keeping with this belief,
provides that the "primary purpose" of the "national government" is "to provide
domestic tranquility by reducing risk," either "fiscal" or "physical." Thus, the new
constitution provides that the "national government" shall have "sufficient power
to eliminate" environmental threats and "economic uncertainty., 7 Article II
insures that the presidency shall be the most powerful branch, by authorizing it "to
use any powers, real or imagined, to set our nation to rights by making any rules
or regulations the president deems appropriate." 8 By way of pointing to one of his
basic criticisms of this new order, Lowi also sees this article as authorizing the
president to "sub-delegate this authority to any other official or agency." 9 In turn,
the right to make "all such rules and regulations is based upon" 10 the morality
implicit in this new constitution, namely, "that the office of the presidency
embodies the will of the real majority of the American nation."" Article III,
consonant with this presidential supremacy, pictures Congress as merely a
"consensual body"' 2 and, though possessed of "legislative authority,' ' 13 it "should
limit itself to the delegation of broad grants of unstructured authority to the
president." 14 Article IV of the new constitution enthrones the bureaucracy
"whose right to govern is based upon... the delegations of power flowing from
Congress... and the authority inherent in professional training and promotion
through and administrative hierarchy."15 The judicial branch, dealt with in Article
V, is empowered to ride herd on the states through the vigorous enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, "but in no instance shall the courts review the
constitutionality of Congress's grants of authority to the president or to the federal
administrative agencies."' 6 Article VI, as he would have it, holds that "The public
interest shall be defined by the satisfaction of the voters in their constituencies.
The test of the public interest is reelection.' 7 Finally, by way of indicating the
transformation of our ordinary political processes, Lowi points to the
pervasiveness of "iron triangles,"' 8 i.e., "actual policy-making will not come from
voter preferences or congressional enactment but from a process of tripartite
bargaining between the specialized administrators, relevant members of Congress,
and the representatives of self-selected organized interests."'19
6. Id.
7. Id. at xi.
8. Id.
9. Id. at xi.
10. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM, xii (W.W. Norton 2 ed.,1979).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALisM, xii (WAV. Norton 2 ed.,1979).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
[Vol. 36:621
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Other observers, though far from sharing Lowi's political orientation, would
agree with much of what he has to say about the altered nature of our political
landscape. Christopher DeMuth, president of the American Enterprise Institute,
sees the emergence of "the new Executive State" in the United States; a regime in
which the federal bureaucracy, through the broad authority delegated to it by
Congress, intimidates and burdens individuals, small businesses, corporations,
interests of various descriptions, as well as state and local governments, with a
plethora of stifling and burdensome regulations. On his showing, the delegation
of broad, often undefined, authority has drastically transformed the distribution of
powers specified in the Constitution and undermined republican government. The
Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, by simply mandating marginal
improvements in the quality of air places enormous financial burdens on the
states, localities, and private sector; burdens which many of these entities are
simply unable to meet. Worse still, in these and like cases, those sectors most
adversely affected by such mandates often seek "waivers" to delay compliance or
otherwise soften the impact of the new regulations, thereby placing themselves
permanently and more firmly under the control of the bureaucracy. Or the
bureaucracy may actually legislate by setting down unauthorized or unwarranted
rules and regulations. Under Title IX of the Education Act, DeMuth points out,
the bureaucracy has issued rules that mandate colleges and universities to
"equalize" men's and women's sports programs, both in terms of participation and
financial commitment-a policy that has forced some institutions to drop certain
men's sports. Yet, no such goal was expressly set by Congress, nor, perhaps, could
it have been because of the opposition it would have aroused. Often, though, the
bureaucracy is not so forthcoming about its activities. For example, the FCC, with
the authorization of Congress, imposes a tax on long distance service that yields 5
billion dollars annually to provide computers and internet access for the public
schools. At the same time, however, the FCC has cautioned telephone companies
against itemizing this tax on bills to their consumers so that it might remain
hidden. DeMuth observes that the government has even resorted to intimidation
and extortion to augment its revenues and increase its regulatory control over
perfectly legal enterprises. Such, at least, is the case with the gun manufacturers
and tobacco industry.
The conservative columnist George Will commenting on DeMuth's speech
echoes certain salient aspects of Lowi's lament:
We are not just now losing limited government as the Founders conceived it and as
Americans debated it from the founding until the second half of the 20th century.
That conception and that debate are history. Several presidencies, particularly those
of FDR and LBJ, and compliant Supreme Courts long ago interred the ideas that
the federal government is limited by the Constitution's enumeration of its powers;
that significant spheres of life are fenced off from the federal government; that there
20. Christopher C. DeMuth, After the Ascent: Politics and Government in the Super-Affluent
Society, Francis Boyer Lecture at American Enterprise Institute (Washington, D.C. February 15,
2000).
2001]
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• 21are some human wants and grievances that are not properly public business.
The Undermining of Original Principles. Extrapolating from the commentary
of Lowi, DeMuth, and others, it is plain that the Philadelphia Constitution has
been undermined by two developments: a derangement in the functions of its
major institutions, legislative, executive, and judicial; and an enormous
centralization of powers. 22 At the risk of dwelling on what is already common
knowledge to the most casual student of the American system, let me briefly
examine these two developments.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the extent of the derangement of the
legislative, executive, and judicial functions is to recall what Madison writes in The
Federalist about the role of and potential dangers posed by legislatures in
republican regimes at that point when he is discussing the nature of our system of
separated powers. He remarks in Federalist No. 51 that "In republican
government, the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates." 3 In previous
essays, most notably No. 48, he spells out in no uncertain terms the need to bear in
mind that the legislature is the center of power in republics. The executive "in a
representative republic," he informs us, "is carefully limited both in the extent and
the duration of his power," whereas "the legislative power is exercised by an
assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an
intrepid confidence in its own strength." 24  The legislature he cautions "is
sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so
numerous as to be incapable of pursing the objects of its passions, by means which
reason prescribes. '25 He concludes this warning with a stem admonition: "it is
against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to
indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions., 26
Madison did not think the task of keeping the legislature in check would be
easy. "Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and less susceptible
of precise limits," he remarks, means that "it can with the greater facility, mask
21. George F. Will, Federal Swelling, WASHINGTON POST, February 24, 2000, A24.
22. This is quite understandable in light of the fact that over the years-at least since 1879 when
Woodrow Wilson wrote of the virtues of English cabinet government-Progressive reformers have
been intent on overcoming the centripetal forces of the separation of powers and centralizing power in
the federal government. For an excellent anthology of various reform proposals see REFORMING
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, (Donald L. Robinson, ed. 1985). This anthology contains an excellent
bibliography of works dealing with the changes in the constitutional order, as well as the presumed
need for even further consolidation of powers.
Given the goals of Progressivism, it is hardly surprising that the modem judiciary attracts
scarcely any attention in their reform programs. From another perspective, however, this lack of
attention casts doubts on the integrity of their movement. They would reform the electoral processes,
the Congress, the presidency, and the political parties in order to achieve greater electoral
accountability. Yet, they seem unconcerned about the accountability of judiciary that now exercises
vast powers, well beyond those ever contemplated by the Founders.
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 67 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan,
eds. 1990).
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 at 256 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan,
eds. 1990).
25. Id.
26. Id.
[Vol. 36:621
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under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on
the coordinate departments."27 By contrast, the executive power is "restrained
within a narrower compass" and is "more simple in nature."' ' The judiciary, he
goes on to observe, is "described by landmarks, still less uncertain" than those that
mark out executive powers. For these reasons, he concludes that "projects of
usurpation by either of these departments, would immediately betray and defeat
themselves." 29
To this we can add that reading the Philadelphia Constitution with an
innocent eye clearly reveals that the Congress was intended to be the primary and
most powerful branch. We find that it is treated with in Article I, not article II or
Ill. We see that virtually all the powers of the proposed national government are
delegated to it. We learn that Congress possesses the power, provided the
requisite majorities can be had, to police the other departments through the
impeachment process. 30  These are among the most prominent reasons why the
Framers, in order to maintain the separation between branches-a separation they
regarded as essential to prevent tyranny-followed a policy of strengthening the
weaker branches by giving a qualified veto to the president and life tenure for
good behavior to the judges, while weakening the stronger branch, the legislature,
by dividing it into two branches.
As Lowi observes, increasingly over the course of the Twentieth Century the
presidency has come to be viewed as the one office that represents all of the
American people,31 whereas Congress is normally pictured as parochial, as often
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. As Gary Wills puts this:
Congress is given what might be called, 'shoot-out' power, the weapons for final showdown
with both other branches. Suppose a President refuses to execute the laws passed by
Congress. Congress has a resort: It can impeach the President. The President, unlike even
limited or constitutional monarchs, cannot dissolve his parliament. He can veto; but if the
Congress overrides, he has no further resort.
"The Supreme Court," he continues, "is in the same situation." While it can declare a law
unconstitutional, Congress "can amend the Constitution on the contested point." More: "Congress has
a variety of weapons" to deal with the Court -"it can impeach the justices; it can refuse to levy funds
for enforcing the Court's decision; it can pass constitutional laws on related matters that make the
Court's original declaration of unconstitutionality nugatory; it can change the makeup of the Court; it
can amend the Constitution to deny judicial review." See GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICAN: THE
FEDERALIST, 128 (New York: Doubleday, 1981). To the point that the Framers intended that
Congress be the principal department government, see also his more recent work: GARY WILLS, A
NECESSARY EvIL A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GoVERNMENT (Simon & Schuster, 1999).
What Wills says is clearly the case if we use the Philadelphia Constitution as our referent. But
political considerations and deep seated public attitudes regarding what is politically "legitimate" have
enormously undermined the original powers of Congress. For Congress to exercise the some of the
major constitutional prerogatives cited by Wills seems as likely as the British monarch vetoing an act of
Parliament. And that is a measure of how far we have departed from the original constitutional
understanding.
31. Woodrow Wilson was among the first to exalt the Presidency in terms that have become
commonplace today. Writing in 1908, he draws the following picture of the president:
[h]e is ... the political leader of the nation, or has it in his choice to be. The nation as a
whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has not other political spokesman. His is the
only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the
20011
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standing in the way of "reform" and "progress." 32  What is hardly disputed
nowadays is that the president has emerged over the decades as the "chief
legislator," as the one who sets down the legislative agenda to a far greater extent
than the Congressional leadership. In the area of foreign affairs he stands almost
alone with what now seems an authority to commit American armed forces at his
sole discretion.33 The courts for their part have to an increasing extent in recent
times embraced an "activism" that provides ample room for them to legislate, so
country, and no other signal force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily
overpower him. His position takes the imagination of the country. He is the representative
of no constituency, but of the whole people. When he speaks in his true character, he speaks
for no special interest.
See WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, (Columbia
University Press, 1964) (1908).
Clinton Rossiter, writing nearly fifty years later speaks in similarly glowing terms about the
representative character of the president and his powers. See CLINTON ROSSITER, AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY, 18-21 (Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1956). "The President," he writes, "is the
American people's one authentic trumpet, and he has no higher duty than to give a clear and certain
sound." At another point he remarks: "Throughout our history there have been moments of triumph
or dedication or frustration or even shame when the will of the people-the General Will, I suppose we
could call it-demanded to be heard clearly and unmistakably." He laments that "It took the line of
Presidents some time to grasp the meaning of this function," though modem presidents he assures us
do. Rossiter holds that, as a matter of constitutional duty, the president is "Chief of State, Chief
Executive, Chief Diplomat, Commander in Chief," as well as "Chief Legislator." To this he adds the
distinctly non-constitutional functions, among them, "Chief of Party" and "Chief of Prosperity," which
taken together with the official duties, render the office "greater than and different from the sum of its
parts." In other words, if we are to judge by Rossiter's account, Wilson's vision of the presidency had
come to be a reality by the middle of the Twentieth Century.
32. See WOODROW WILSON, supra note 31. Woodrow Wilson seems to have set the tone for the
modem criticism of Congress. In 1884, he wrote: "Though honest and diligent, it is meddlesome and
inefficient" exhibiting the same "clumsiness" and "distemper" that characterized the "first parliaments
of William and Mary." He quotes extensively from Walter Bagehot's ENGLISH CONSTITUTION to
convey the character of the "distemper" displayed by the "Lower House" of parliament: "'jealous',"
"'fickle'," and "'factious'." And Wilson, again quoting from Bagehot, ascribes the causes for this
distemper to the absence of "recognized leaders" to provide "guidance," the lack of "adequate
information," and the totally inadequate "organization out of which alone a definite policy can come."
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 204-05
(Meridian Books, 1956) (1884).
In more recent decades, critics of Congress have emphasized "gridlock" or "deadlock," the
product of the irresolution of Congress. Lloyd Cutler's comments are typical. Congress now
represents "many diverse and highly organized interest groups," many of them "single interest"
groups, that stand ready to "reward or punish" legislators. Thus, it is not difficult to see why it acts
decisively only when "there is a large consensus induced by some crisis." "To form a Government."
See REFORMING AMERIcAN GOvERNMENT, 20 -1 (Donald L. Robison, ed. 1985). Perhaps the most
important and comprehensive work since World War II in stressing the gridlock and advancing the
case for "reform" that would eliminate the congressional stumbling blocks to enactment of Progressive
policies is JAMES MCGREGOR BURNS'S, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY, (Prentice-Hall, 1963).
Much of the criticism of Congress stems from the observation that, because it represents special
interests, it speaks with "many tongues," whereas the president speaks with but one "authentic" voice.
On the intriguing question of which institution, the president or Congress, best represents the views of
the American people see WILLMOORE KENDALL, "THE Two MAJORITIES" VILLMOORE KENDALL
CONTRA MUNDUM, (Nellie Kendall, ed. 1971).
33. An excellent overview and analysis of the president's growing power in this area is ROBERT
SCIGLIANO, "The New Understanding of the President's War Power," LIBERTY UNDER LAW:
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW, 135 (Kenneth L Grasso
and Cecilia Rodriguez Catillo, eds. 1998). Scigliano writes: "Whatever their precise number, the
instances in which presidents prior to the Second World War made war independently of Congress
were few. Moreover, except in the case of the Mexican War, they were not of the magnitude of the
instances that have occurred since that time." Id.
[Vol. 36:621
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much so that is no longer true, as Madison wrote, that the "legislative department
alone has access to the pockets of the people."34
The second development, centralization, is related to the derangement of
functions, but it is sufficiently distinctive to merit separate attention and analysis.
Again, if we take The Federalist as our guide, we find that the Framers clearly
intended that there should a division of powers between the state and national
government. In Federalist no. 39, that paper devoted to discussing the federal
character of the proposed union, Madison writes that the proposed government
"cannot be deemed a national [unitary] one ... since its jurisdiction extends to
certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." 35 Hamilton, writing in Federalist No.
9, seemed to share much the same view. As he put it: "The proposed
Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State Governments, makes
them constituent parts of the national sovereignty by allowing them a direct
representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and
very important portions of sovereign power.
36
The notion that the states possess "inviolable sovereignty" or "certain
exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power" has long since
vanished.37 The last century witnessed the application of the Bill of Rights to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, a process which render the federal
38courts a monitor of the most important state actions. Indeed, with the rise of a
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 at 256 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan,
eds. 1990). This, of course, is no longer the case. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). It should
also be noted that judicial remedies, whether for increased prison space or busing to achieve racial
integration, have required increased expenditures by the states and national governments. In sum,
with the acceptance of judicial activism, another manifestation of the breakdown of the Philadelphia
Constitution, the traditional barriers to the judicial authority have disappeared.
35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 at 1986 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan,
eds. 1990).
36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 at 41(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James
McClellan, eds. 1990).
The best statement in THE FEDERALIST concerning the exact division of these powers if found in
essay no. 45.
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and
foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will for the most part be connected.
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberty and properties of the people; and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 238 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan, eds.
1990).
This formulation provides an excellent benchmark against which we can measure the degree to
which powers are centralized today. In fact, for all intents and purposes, we are a unitary, not a federal
system; there is no area mentioned among those "reserved to the several States" over which the
national government does not exercise final control.
37. On the extent to which this formulation was accepted in the ratification debates and
conventions, as well as by the leading figures in the Founding period see RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS, 1987).
38. Charles Warren, the noted constitutional historian, warned shortly after the decision in Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)-the first instance of incorporation- that once the process of
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judicial activism the courts have legislated, in effect, dictating to the states what
they must do to comply with mandates that presumably derived from the
Constitution. The courts have even assumed control over prisons and taken on
the responsibilities of school superintendents. 9
While the role of the courts has attracted attention, the intrusion of Congress
into what was once regarded the domain of the states through the use of its
commerce power is not so widely recognized.4° The columnist John Leo draws
attention to the bizarre way this power is used by Congress. Commenting upon
the Violence Against Women Act enacted in 1994, he writes: "In passing this
legislation, Congress cited its all-purpose excuse of overriding or duplicating
states' jurisdiction, the commerce clause of the Constitution. Congress said that
violence against women has a significant effect on the economy.., by impeding
women's travel and employment." Leo goes on to note, "But if this is right, why
couldn't Congress cite the cost of all violence directed at females (41 percent of
the annual total) as well as the violence directed at males (59 percent)? Surely all
violence, not just the 'gender based' variety, has an economic effect." He rightly
concludes: "The commerce clause is an all-purpose pretext for dubious federal
legislation." 41
WHO OR WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEMISE OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
The foregoing only presents only the bare outline of the reasons for holding
incorporation had been set in motion (something the Court up this point had resisted) there would be
no logical stopping point. He saw that this process would eventually lead to the demise of federalism
by allowing the federal courts to supervise and control the states in those areas traditionally thought to
be among the states' reserved powers. See Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926).
39. For an excellent critical discussion of the Court's activities in this area see chapter five, "Rule by
Judges," in PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LARRY M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE (Regnery
Publishing, 1995).
40. In this regard the constitutional law courses in most political science departments would seem to
be different from those in the law schools. The law school courses with which I am familiar do place an
emphasis upon the commerce power, whereas those in the political science departments stress the Bill
of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and civil liberties.
41. John Leo, Dubious results from well-intentioned fixes, WASHINGTON TIMES, February 1, 2000,
at A19. It is true that in San Antonio School District v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1996), the Court for the
first time in sixty years invalidated a congressional law based on the commerce power. But this
decision is likely to be an aberration for at least two reasons. First, Congress did not attach a "finding"
to legislation that was invalidated; that is, a finding showing the relationship between the legislation
(School Gun Safety Zone Act) and interstate commerce. Second, the Court will come up against
enormous obstacles in formulating rules or formulas that can be uniformly applied to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of the power; i.e., when the objective is regulation of interstate
commerce versus when it is used as a "cover" to usurp state "police powers."
The federal government's successful effort to raise the drinking age to 21 illustrates the powers
Congress has at its disposal to force the states to comply with its wishes. In this instance, the Congress
threatened to withhold highway funds from recalcitrant states; a bullying tactic that is scarcely
inconsequential given the number and scope of grant-in-aid programs. If this tactic had not worked,
however, Congress was prepared to use its commerce power to cut off shipments of alcohol to those
states refusing to raise the drinking age. Any of the Court's landmark decisions on the commerce
power-e.g., U.S. vs. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)-would clearly have supported such congressional
action, whereas under the Philadelphia Constitution a constitutional amendment would have been
required.
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that the Philadelphia Constitution has, so to speak, expired. The fact is that
volumes could be written by way of elaborating on what has been said. For many
observers the question is not whether the Philadelphia Constitution has survived,
but rather who or what killed it. On this score at least three general answers are
frequently offered.
Founders. An obvious one is that the Framers miscalculated; that they went
too far in weakening the legislature relative to the other branches; that they could
not see the obvious advantages that the chief executive would enjoy in the
political struggles to come. Certainly, they could not have anticipated the
development of political parties in a fashion that would allow presidents to claim,
as Andrew Jackson did, that they represent the people every bit as much as the
Congress. Nor could they have anticipated that the Supreme Court would play
the role that it has come to play, particularly in the second half of the Twentieth
Century after its decisions in the Desegregation cases.42 Then, too, the Framers
seemed to be genuinely concerned that the states would encroach on federal
authority rather than vice versa. For this reason they did not perceive that the
states would need protection against encroachments by the national government.
In sum, it might be said that the Framers were not prescient enough; they could
not anticipate changes in the political landscape.
Amendments. Many critics of our present centralized system offer still
another explanation. They point to the amendments that have been added,
placing great stress on the 17th Amendment that provided for the direct election
of Senators.43 In their view, this virtually removed the interests of the states from
42. I refer here to Brown v. Board of Education 349 U.S. 294 (1954) and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954). With these decisions, in the words of Richard E. Morgan, we "ushered into the modem era
of constitutional law: Courts were now seen as a source of governmental power that could force
unpopular changes that could be secured through representative institutions." "If judges," he points
out, "could sidestep the electoral and legislative processes, by bypassing the very forms of the
Constitution, in order to serve the higher good of ending Jim Crow, then judges could do many things
about which the country was deeply divided." Richard E. Morgan, Coming Clean about Brown, 6 CITY
JOURNAL 48.49 (Summer, 1996).
In these cases, quite unlike early substantive due processes cases-e.g., Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905)-the Court went beyond invalidating law to actually mandating prescribed action.
In this sense, the Court did assert an unprecedented power, not supported by the original justifications
of judicial review set forth by Hamilton in Federalist no. 78 or Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). On this point, see GEORGE W. CAREY, IN DEFENSE OF THE
CONSTITrTION, (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1995). Moreover, in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 29
(1958) the Court went a step further. As Charles S. Hyneman put it:
In the opinion accompanying this decision, the Supreme Court made a series of statements
which were intended -I do not see how there can be any doubt about the intent-to force
this conclusion: What this Court says the Constitution means is exactly what the Constitution
does mean, and all other public officials and branches of government, national and state,
shall respect this Court's statements of the Constitutions means, no matter what other
interpretation may seem to them to be clearly implied by the words of that document.
See CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, 78 (Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963).
43. For a superb article that maintains the Seventeenth Amendment dealt a fatal blow to the
Framers' design of federalism see Ralph Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism,
the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671 (Summer, 1999). For
an informative and insightful examination of the politics and ideology behind the move for direct
election of Senators see C. H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT (Transaction Publishers, 1995).
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effective participation in the legislative processes, thereby opening the way for the
national government to aggrandize state powers. Yet, this is questionable in light
of the fact that the 16th amendment, passed when many Senators were elected by
state legislatures (enough at any rate to block the amendment had they so
chosen), has perhaps done more than any other to increase the powers of the
national government vis-&t-vis the states. Armed with the progressive income tax,
the best source of revenue, the national government has assumed a dominant
financial position that allows it to dictate to the states. Of course, there is no
gainsaying the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation
process in accounting for the decline of the states and the death of the Framers'
system. This scarcely needs recounting here.
Congressional Powers. Still another explanation, as indicated in the remarks
above, is the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of the commerce power that came
about in the middle 1930's, an interpretation that cleared the way for Roosevelt
II's New Deal and the emergence of the modern welfare state. Likewise, an
expanded conception of the "general welfare," inherent in the New Deal goals,
has also led to the national government assuming a far great role in controlling
and directing the activities of states, primarily through literally hundreds of grant-
in-aid programs. In this regard, Albert J. Nock's observations, written during the
first term of Roosevelt II, are both appropriate and revealing:
When the Johnstown flood occurred, social power [the private sector] was
immediately mobilized and applied with intelligence and vigor. Its abundance,
measured by money alone, was so great that when everything was finally put in
order, something like a million dollars remained. If such a catastrophe happened
now, not only is social power perhaps too depleted for the like exercise, but the
general instinct would be to let the State [national government] see to it.44
And so it is today that one of the generally acknowledged responsibilities is
to provide disaster relief to the states and localities, underscoring once again the
primacy of the national government.
45
THE BASIC CAUSE: PROGRESSIVISM
These and like explanations, however, including those proffered by Lowi,
focus primarily on symptoms. Put otherwise, the Philadelphia Constitution and
the principles it embodies have been "done in," so to speak, by an underlying
44. See NOCK, supra note 3.
45. This generally accepted view of what constitutes the "general welfare" and the responsibilities
of the national government have served to shrink and weaken the capacity of private subsidiary groups
to provide needed social functions and relief. This comes about largely through a change of attitude, as
much as from a reallocation of resources. On this score, Nock writes:
If the State has bade such matters its business, and has confiscated the social power
necessary to deal with them, why let it deal with them. We can get some kind of rough
measure of this general atrophy by our own disposition when approached by a beggar. Two
years ago we might have been moved to give him something; today we are moved to refer
him to a State's relief-agency.... our instinct is to say that the State has already confiscated
our quarter for his benefit, and he should go to the State about it.
Id. at 24.
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ideological sea change. More specifically, the last century witnessed the growth
and, finally, the dominance of Progressivism whose main outlines were set forth by
Herbert Croly with the publication in 1911 of his major work, The Promise of
46American Life. While Croly's original blue print has been modified over the
decades, the core beliefs, assumptions, and objectives have remained the same.
Croly believed that "The American system stands for the highest hope of an
excellent worldly life that mankind has yet ventured,-the hope than men can be
improved without being fettered, that they can be saved without even vicariously
being nailed to the cross." 47 But, as he writes in his opening chapter, this hope is
gradually fading from sight, largely due to "prodigious concentration of wealth,
and of the power exercised by wealth, in the hands of a few men."48 His program
to overcome these conditions and to realize the American potential involved, inter
alia, "the complete emancipation of the individual ' 49 which, in turn, meant
transforming man's nature from acquisitiveness to disinterestedness so that
individuals would willingly place the higher collective purpose and good above
that of their self-interest. This required, as Croly put it, a drastic reform of the
capitalist system, particularly its materialism and incentives. Individuals could
never be fully emancipated so long as "mercenary motives" or "selfish acquisitive
motives in the economic field"5 prevailed over disinterested motives. "The only
way in which work can be made entirely disinterested," he wrote, "is to adjust its
compensation to the needs of a normal and wholesome human life.'
While it is beyond our purpose here to detail Croly's ambitious program,
certain of its key characteristics should be noted.
Secular Humanism. Croly's thought bears a close relationship to what
Vernon Parrington would later call the "French Romantic School" of thought in
the American tradition; the school of thought that presumably dominated at the
time of the Declaration of Independence. 52 For our purposes it is sufficient to
note that Croly subscribed to certain basic tenets that are associated with the
46. HERBERT CROLY, PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (Macmillan Company, 1909).
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 23.
49. Id. at 417.
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id. at 417.
52. VERNON L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 275-76 (Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1927). Parrington writes of the French romantic philosophy that it sought "a juster, more
wholesome social order"; that it held "reason and not interests should determine social institutions"
and "that the ultimate ends to be sought were universal liberty, equality, and fraternity."
Whereas he pictured the French philosophical approach as "humanitarian" and "appealing to
reason and seeking social justice," he drew a dark picture of the opposing school of thought, "English
liberalism." He regarded it as "self-centered, founded on the right of exploitation, and looking toward
capitalism." Id.
Parrington fleshed out Progressive historicism that pictured the Constitution as a reactionary
and undemocratic document designed to protect and advance the interests of the rich and well born.
This version of history draws a sharp line between the values and ideals expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and those found in the Constitution. While originally greeted with great skepticism, the
Progressive account of our Founding period could be found in a large majority of college American
history texts by middle of the Twentieth Century. See Douglass Adair, The Tenth Federalist Revisited,
FAMtE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS, (Trevor Colbourn, ed. 1974).
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Enlightenment thinking that fueled the French Revolution.53 One of the more
important of these is secular humanism, a doctrine that is apparent in Croly's
understanding of the "hope" which the American nation holds out, namely, an
"excellent worldly life." This secular humanism is evident in other important
dimensions of his thought. We should not, he maintains, simply "accept human
nature as it is, but move it in the direction of improvement."5 4 Not only does he
maintain that human nature is capable of improvement, he goes on to quote
approvingly from John Jay Chapman to the effect that "Democracy assumes
perfection in human nature."55 What is perhaps most telling is that Croly, in
elaborating on his educational program to undo the acquisitive nature of man,
sees no role for religion. Nor does he take into account the Christian
understanding of the nature of man; that understanding which points to the
limitations of worldly powers to transform human nature, particularly in the
directions Croly desired, without the use of oppressive force.
Egalitarianism. A second major characteristic of progressive thought as set
forth by Croly is egalitarianism. His egalitarianism goes far beyond "one person,
one vote," equality before the law, or equal privileges and immunities. At the
outset of his work, Croly indicates the dimensions of the equality. He agrees with
John B. Crozier who had written some years earlier that the American nation was
marked by a "broad equality of material and social conditions" such as "equal
material opportunities, equal education, equal laws, equal opportunities, and
equal opportunities to all positions of honor and trust., 56 Croly felt, however, that
the subsequent concentration of wealth, which had led in due course to a
concentration of power, had change all of this; that Crozier's picture of American
society was rapidly disintegrating. In large measure, his concern was to restore the
53. Nicholas Capaldi's excellent analysis of the "liberal paradigm" -which corresponds to
"Progressivism"-parallels our analysis. He differentiates between Enlightenments (e.g., Scottish,
French) and identifies the philosophical sources of the elements of Enlightenment thought that are
most prominent in American thought today. He also points to the same underlying tenets I have
identified.
At the level of political tactics, Capaldi writes: "Until the later 1930s, the advocates of the liberal
paradigm sought to introduce national reform by trying to capture, through democratic means, either
the Presidency or the Congress. Failure to do so has led to an attempt to capture the Court, which is
more insulated from the electorate. The Court is also more vulnerable to the influence of intellectual
currents such as the current domination by the liberal paradigm of the Enlightenment Project. The
movement from democracy to authoritarian expertise is part of the inner logic of the Enlightenment
Project." Nicholas Capaldi, The Liberal Paradigm in Affirmative Action Law, 43 LOYOLA L. REv. 526
(1998).
For a fuller development of Capaldi's thesis, see NICHOLAS CAPALDI, THE ENLIGHTENMENT
PROJECT IN THE ANALYTIC CONVERSATION (Kluwer Academic Press, 1998).
54. HERBERT CROLY, PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE, 413 (Northeastern University Press edition,
1998) (1909).
55. Id. at 418.
56. Id. at 15. In this connection he does note that there is mixed into this equality an appropriate
and "sufficient inequality.., to keep it sweet and human." This is important to his construct,
particularly for achieving the national promise. Croly depended upon the better sort of individual,
those who would stand "above" the generality of men in society, to provide the examples and
leadership necessary for a higher type of associated life that would come with individual emancipation.
His quest for equality was modified by his recognition of the need for a suitable hierarchy.
Nevertheless, the realization of greater equality, social and economic, is a major theme in this work.
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equalities that presumably had been lost and to place them on firmer foundations.
Since economic inequality was at the root of the other inequalities, he persistently
called for a redistribution of wealth. Indeed, he felt his vision could not be
achieved unless the American society undertook "to regulate the distribution of
wealth in the national interest."57  In various ways, he condemned what he
regarded as the "morally and socially undesirable distribution of wealth" that
existed and the effects it had on blocking the realization of the national promise. 58
Centralization. A third major element of Croly's thought was the imperative
need for centralization of political authority at the national level. He
acknowledged that his program called for "a radical transformation of the
traditional national policy and democratic creed. 5 9 "The way to realize a purpose
is," he writes, "not to leave it to chance, but to keep it loyally in mind, and adopt
means proper to the importance and difficulty of the task." The shortcomings and
problems he identifies, he insists throughout, are those of "American national
democracy" and, as such, their "solution must be attempted chiefly by means of
official national action."6 Later, in dealing with specifics, he writes of "collective
purpose," "collective responsibility," "collective power," and "collective
organization.,61 Croly regarded the traditional federalism, one in which the states
possessed important powers beyond the control of the national government, as
anathema. In this respect, he severely chastises Jefferson, who he concedes
possessed a finer vision of the good society than Hamilton, but who, unlike
Hamilton, was seriously deficient in understanding the need for a strong central
government as the means for the realization of his vision.
PROGRESSIVISM AND THE PHILADELPHIA CONSTITUTION: A
MISFIT
Croly adopted a condescending attitude towards the Founding Fathers. He
allowed that they did well for their time; that is, they pushed the cause of political
centralism about as far as they could given the political circumstances of the time.
Yet, save possibly for Hamilton, they did not see the full potential of the new
government as a vehicle for collective action. Most certainly Jefferson and his
fellow Republicans failed to perceive its potential in fulfilling the grander
purposes embodied in the national promise. For his part, though, Croly did not
explore the major areas of incompatibility between his progressive vision and the
Philadelphia Constitution. These areas of incompatibility are deep and broad;
they point to fundamental reasons why the Philadelphia Constitution could never
serve as an instrument for the realization of Croly's national promise. Here we
can only touch upon those where there seems to be an irreconcilable difference
57. Id. at 409.
58. Id. at 22.
59. Il- at 413.
60. HERBERT CROLY, PROMISE OF AMERIcAN LiFE, 24 (Northeastern University Press, 1998)
(1909).
61. Id. at 408-09.
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between Croly's view-a view which had dominated since the days of the New
Deal-and the belief and postulates underlying the Philadelphia Constitution
Nature of Republicanism. The Constitution is not an ends oriented
document, whereas the achievement of given ends is central to Croly's state. This
is to say, the Framers' objective was primarily to provide a means for making
decisions, while simultaneously securing the rule of law. "The regulation of
various and interfering interests," Madison informs us, was to be the "principal
task" of Congress6z, whose members were to be selected through a competitive
electoral process. Put another way, the principal mission of the new government
was not "positive" in nature; its mission clearly was not, to use Lowi's
terminology, that of "reducing risks," either financial or physical. If there were to
be New Deals or Wars on Poverty under the forms of the Philadelphia
Constitution, they would be conducted at the state or local levels. But more
importantly, these and like ends were not conceived to be inherent to the concept
of republicanism as Croly would have it. What was inherent in republicanism,
from their vantage point, was that ultimate control over government would rest
with the majority.63
Nature of Man and Religion. While there is great debate about the role that
religious beliefs played in the framing of the Philadelphia Constitution, it is
evident that the Framers accepted a view of man consonant with the mainstream
religious beliefs, the most significant of which revolved around the Fall and
original sin. This is illustrated perhaps most dramatically in the correspondence
between Adams and Jefferson, two giants of the Founding period whose religious
views were hardly "centrist." Neither held that man was perfectible. Both were
concerned about the need to control government in order to prevent "tyranny";
both were aware of the darker side of man that rendered republicanism vulnerable
to majority oppression. In fact, of all the leading figures of the formative period,
Adams wrote more extensively than any other about the dangers of republican
government attributable to the nature of man and how they might be prevented
through the proper alignment of institutions. Hamilton may have put the matter
most bluntly when he wrote that "men are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious" 64,
but Madison was inclined, albeit in gentler terms, to this position. He recognized
that oppressive majorities would pose problems for the republic and that the
rulers might use their powers to tyrannize the society. He knew as well that
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 45 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan,
eds. 1990).
63. In this connection, Madison writes:
If we resort for a criterion, to the different principles on which different forms of
government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow the name
on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the people; and is
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during
good behavior.
See THE FEDERALiST No. 39 at 194 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan, eds.
1990).
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 6 at 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James
McClellan, eds. 1990).
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"neither moral nor religious motives" or "parchment '' 65 barriers would serve as
adequate barriers to oppression or tyranny.
In sum, whether due to religious influences or not, the Framers' view of
human nature and its perfectibility is at odds with that held by Croly.
Acquisitiveness. At still another level, Madison's understanding of human
nature differs in important particulars from Croly's. From Madison's vantage
point, a "uniformity of interests" is impossible. There is, he writes, a "diversity in
the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate." So long as this
diversity exists (and Madison believes it is "the first object of government" to
protect this diversity), he concludes that there will be "a division of the society
into different interests and parties" based on "different degrees and kinds of
property." 66 The unarticulated premise here, of course, is that man is an
acquisitive being; that men will use their different and unequal capacities to
acquire property, thereby setting off the processes leading to inequalities he
describes. But unlike Croly, Madison does not condemn this acquisitive nature.
He accepts it as a given, something that must be recognized and understood for a
stable political and social order. Largely because they would run counter to the
nature of man, he contends proposals for "an equal division of property" 67 would
be factious, i.e., "adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community."("
Did Madison believe this acquisitive nature could be overcome? Could
Croly's vision of a "disinterested" individual seeking a higher form of associated
life free from incentives of the capitalist system be realized? In his writings, we
find that Madison believes that religious life and training from early youth, such as
that provided by the Moravians, Harmonites and Shakers, would be necessary to
overcome man's acquisitive proclivities. 69 In sum, from Madison's perspective at
least, barring early indoctrination by some coercive force, Croly's national
promise could never be achieved. And once achieved, such indoctrination would
be required for each successive generation in order to avoid a return to an
acquisitive way of life.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCOMPATIBILITY
To go no further, the fact is that the Philadelphia Constitution and what
would appear to be the widely held assumptions of its drafters are at odds with
65. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 46 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan,
eds. 1990).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 48.
68. Id. at 44.
69. On this point, see JArMS MADISON, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, (Marvin Meyers, ed. 1981).
Madison was highly skeptical of the feasibility of a scheme designed to emancipate the slaves that
relied called upon individuals within a community to contribute voluntarily according to abilities, while
being rewarded on the basis of need. One of the major problems he noted was that "each individual
would feel that the fruit of his exertions would be shared by others whether equally or unequally
making them; and that the exertion of others would equally avail him, notwithstanding a deficiency in
his own." Id. at 330.
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Progressivism. It simply is not based on a view of man or human nature
compatible with Progressivism or, which comes to the same thing, Croly's quest
for the fulfillment of the "national promise." The obvious upshot is that the
Philadelphia Constitution is not appropriate or well suited vehicle for the
achievement of progressive ends.
What this means, of course, is that Progressivism can only realize its goals by
"refashioning" the Constitution, by making it seem as if the Constitution were a
"living" document that had acquired new meaning with each passing generation.
70
And this is precisely what Progressives have done. They have argued that, for a
variety of reasons, there is no point in trying to figure out what Founders or the
ratifiers intended, that the task may be impossible or, more likely, inconclusive.
The great debate over how best to interpret the Constitution, I would suggest, is
attributable to the fact that Progressives did not want to appear to be scrapping
the original design. Rather they wanted, as far as possible, to create ambiguity
about the Philadelphia Constitution, an ambiguity that would make their ends
seem less "revolutionary" than they are. What does seem abundantly clear is that
the major and most controversial developments-i.e., those developments which
have killed the Philadelphia Constitution-all bear a direct relationship to
Progressivism because they have opened the way for the advance of progressive
goals along the lines suggested by Croly. In this category certainly fall the
limitless delegation of legislative power, judicial activism and legislation,
centralization of power in the national government, and an expansive and
outlandish definition of the commerce power.
This point can be put another way. The Progressives, knowing that
amending the Constitution would not serve their purpose, had to work with what
they had. And what they had, they knew, was not adequate for their purpose, so
they were left with the alternative of "reinterpretation." At the same time, they
could not make it appear as if they were abandoning the Framers' design for that
might well be politically suicidal. Thus this reinterpretation had to take place
under the cover of the ambiguity created about the Founders' original design.
I do not mean to suggest that this was a conspiracy, well thought out in
advance. Not at all. It simply unfolded in this fashion. But once the enormity of
the change was perceived there has been a concerted, though not necessarily
coordinated, effort to "cover up" or to minimize what has taken place by offering
various rationales.
71
70. We find a clear statement of this in the late Justice Brennan's famous Georgetown speech: "We
current judges read the Constitution the only way that we can; as Twentieth-Century Americans ....
What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to
the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn,
cannot be the measure to the vision of their time." THE CONsTTUTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES,
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, (Jack N. Rakove, ed. 1990). Justice Brennan, quite clearly, was
one of the foremost spokesman for Progressivism in the last half of the Twentieth Century.
71. This is particularly true in the law schools for at least two basic reasons. First, the Constitution,
its meaning and uses, is a large part of legal study. But, second, Progressivism predominates on the
faculties in all but a few law schools in the country. In short, law schools are the most appropriate
source for efforts along these lines.
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PHILADELPHIA CONSTITUTION
POTENTIAL DANGERS
The great French political philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenal argues
persuasively that the modem democratic state may well be the most dangerous
regime in human history. In his classic work On Power, he remarks,
It must be noted that Power which is founded on the sovereignty of the people is in
better shape than any other to fight and conquer. If sovereignty resides in a king or
an aristocracy, so that it belongs to but one man or a few, it cannot markedly extend
its scope without clashing with the interests of the majority.72
And this "clash," as he points out, can and has served as an effective restraint on
monarchies and aristocracies of the past. Indeed, the powers at the disposal of the
modem states-principally their powers to conscript and to tax-are those which
the most absolute monarchs of the past could only dream of. Moreover, Jouvenal
notes, there was a time when the Church and Christian natural law doctrines
actually served to limit even the most absolutist kings. Fear of eternal damnation
of the soul often served as a most effective restraint.
In sum, the chilling message of Jouvenal's work is that we lack restraints in
the modem world; that, moreover, the modem world suffers from the "crisis of
rationality" that has spawned relativism and even nihilism. Secularism and
materialism have both served to undermine the natural law and with this the
internal restraints on the exercise of power.
Walter Lippmann in his Public Philosophy makes much the same overall
point, albeit in a slightly different way. The public philosophy for Lippmann
emerged from the better part of the Western tradition, embodying the institutions,
values, tenets, and practices that had proved solid and worthwhile over time. In
his view, the public philosophy also provided transcendent standards for the
society; standards against which the society could measure its institutions and
policies. He believed that only upon the "premises of this philosophy," which
itself was built on the natural law, was it possible "to reach intelligible and
workable conceptions of popular election, majority rule, representative
assemblies, free speech, loyalty, property, corporations and voluntary
associations."73 The public philosophy embraced constitutionalism, the rule of
law, the notion that power ought to be restricted, checked, and held accountable.
Above all its pointed to the dangers of arbitrary rule, unchecked power, and the
lack of restraint on the part of individuals, majorities, or the rulers. Moreover, as
Lippmann would have it, those responsible for the democratic institutions of the
West, including our Founding Fathers, subscribed to the belief that a consensus on
fundamental issues of governance-e.g.,, how decision making authority should be
72. BERTRAND DE JOUVENAL, ON POWER: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ITS GROWTH, 333
(Liberty Fund, 1993) (1949). Jouvenal's point in this respect is similar to that made by Alexis de
Tocqueville: "The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the
majority; for there is nothing in democratic states which is capable of resisting it." DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICAN, 244 2 vols. (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, n.d).
73. WALTER LipPMANN, THE PUBLIc PHILOsOPHY, 79-80 (The New American Library, 1955).
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distributed-could be achieved through deliberation and "honest reflection. 7 4
The death of the Philadelphia Constitution must be cast against this
background. The Progressives have, knowingly or not, ignored or circumvented
the Constitution when it has suited their ends and purposes. Its restraints and
divisions of power, all calculated to prevent tyranny and oppression, have been
effectively discarded. The courts and the bureaucracy are now engaged in making
law and inventing new "rights" and powers. Progressivism, above all, is directed
to ends, to altering our social and economic environment. In this, as Lowi points
out, it has shown scarcely any sensitivity towards the "rule of law" or, for that
matter, "constitutionalism" (i.e., following the decision making paths marked out
in the Philadelphia Constitution).
But the most serious indictment of Progressivism, to recur to Lippmann, is
that it offers no coherent replacement for what it has destroyed. The Progressives
now stand amid the ruins of the Philadelphia Constitution, but they present no
new set of coherent rules for governing with an accompanying morality like that
which the Founding Fathers offered in replacing the Articles of Confederation.
As a consequence, we live under a system that lacks coherence, not to mention
legitimacy. So much is clear from Professor Lowi's new, "unwritten" constitution
that forms the foundation of the Second Republic. The new constitution presents
us with no principled understanding of the limits of government or what constitute
the legitimate processes for law making. The powers and functions of the
branches of government seem to bear no correspondence to republican principles
or to the manner in which authority has been traditionally allocated.
To put this in other terms, precisely when we would seem to be most in need
of a Constitution -and this because of the dangers inherent in modem
democratic states-we are without one. In killing the Philadelphia Constitution
and not providing us with a coherent substitute, the Progressives have left present
and future generations in a very precarious situation. Far more precarious, I
think, than they seem to realize.
74. Id. at 103.
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